By David Swanson, World BEYOND War, March 7, 2022
Here were Russia’s demands for months starting in early December 2021:
- Article 1: the parties should not strengthen their security at the expense of Russia’s security;
- Article 2: the parties will use multilateral consultations and the NATO-Russia Council to address points of conflict;
- Article 3: the parties reaffirm that they do not consider each other as adversaries and maintain a dialogue;
- Article 4: the parties shall not deploy military forces and weaponry on the territory of any of the other states in Europe in addition to any forces that were deployed as of May 27, 1997;
- Article 5: the parties shall not deploy land-based intermediate- and short-range missiles adjacent to the other parties;
- Article 6: all member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization commit themselves to refrain from any further enlargement of NATO, including the accession of Ukraine as well as other States;
- Article 7: the parties that are member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization shall not conduct any military activity on the territory of Ukraine as well as other States in the Eastern Europe, in the South Caucasus and in Central Asia; and
- Article 8: the agreement shall not be interpreted as affecting the primary responsibility of the Security Council of the United Nations for maintaining international peace and security.
These were perfectly reasonable, just what the U.S. demanded when Soviet missiles were in Cuba, just what the U.S. would demand now if Russian missiles were in Canada, and ought to have simply been met, or at the very least treated as serious points to be respectfully considered.
If we set aside items 1-3 and 8 above as less concrete and/or hopeless, we’re left with items 4-7